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DEREGULATION PAS DE DEUX:
DUAL REGULATORY CLASSES OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
THE PATH TO FINANCIAL CRISIS IN SWEDEN AND THE UNITED
STATES
Erik F. Gerding†
This article presents the following model of two regulatory classes of financial
institutions interacting in financial and political markets to spur deregulation and riskier lending
and investment, which in turn contributes to the severity of a financial crisis:
1) Regulation creates two categories of financial institutions. The first class faces greater
restrictions in lending or investment activities but enjoys regulatory subsidies, such as an
explicit or implicit government guarantee, while the second class is more loosely
regulated and can make riskier loans or investments and earn additional profits.
2) These additional profits leads to calls for deregulation to enable the first class to
participate in lucrative lending or investment markets.
3) Deregulation allows the first class of institution either to compete with the second class
in formerly restricted markets or to invest in the second class, in either case, while
retaining its regulatory subsidy.
4) Deregulation spurs additional lending in two ways:
i) subsidy leakage, which occurs when the first class can use subsidized funds to
make riskier investments (including investments in the second class) without
regulation compensating for moral hazard; and
ii) displacement, which occurs when subsidized competition pushes the second
class into riskier market segments.
5) Additional lending increases leverage in the financial system and fuels a boom in an
asset market.
6) Asset prices collapse and threaten the solvency of financial institutions.
This model explains financial deregulation in Sweden in the 1980s, which led to a 1990
bank crisis. The model also provides a framework for scholars to examine whether deregulation
in the United States involving the following dual classes of institutions contributed to the current
crisis:
†
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Law Library faculty for research assistance. The author would also like to acknowledge his former student, Tim
Turnbow, whose student paper on the Swedish government‟s response to its financial crisis introduced him to the
deregulation of the Swedish financial sector in the 1980s.
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¶

GSEs (Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae) and sponsors of “private label” mortgagebacked securities;

¶

Commercial and investment banks with respect to the Glass-Steagall repeal; and

¶

Banks and hedge funds with respect to OTC derivatives.

The model would support the premises of the proposed Volcker Rule, which would
restrict investment activities of banks, but suggests that imposing those restrictions may not be
sustainable in the long run.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Historians, economists, legal scholars and others have written much about the historical
pattern of deregulation preceding financial crises. Some have suggested that deregulation may
cause financial crises or contribute to their severity by leaving economies vulnerable when a
financial crisis hits.1 Still other scholars have laid the fault not on less regulation, but instead on
the failure of existing and newly introduced regulations.2 This article uses deregulation in a
more ecumenical sense to mean regulatory changes that enabled increased lending and risktaking by financial institutions – including the rolling back of financial regulations, underenforcement of regulations, or even government intervention to push financial institutions to
make more loans or take on more risk.3
This article examines one particular way in which deregulation of financial institutions
may take shape and increase the risk and severity of a crisis. This article describes how dual
regulatory classes of financial institutions may interact with one another in both the financial and
political marketplaces to spur deregulation and then riskier lending by institutions, which in turn
increases the probability and severity of a financial crisis. These interactions can be described by
a model with the following elements:
1) Financial regulation creates two categories of institutions:
a) The first class of institution faces greater restrictions in its lending or investment
activities, but enjoys a higher degree of explicit or implicit backing from the
government or other regulatory subsidies than the second class.
b) The second class is more loosely regulated and can take on more risk and earn
additional profits by making certain categories of loans or investments.
2) Profits by the second class leads to calls for deregulation to allow the first class to
participate in lucrative lending or investment markets.
3) Deregulation allows the first class of institution either:
a) To compete with the second class in formerly restricted markets, or
b) To lend to, or invest in, the second class,
in either case, while the first class retains its regulatory subsidy.
4) Deregulation spurs additional lending in two ways:
a) subsidy leakage, which describes when the first class can use subsidized funds to
make riskier investments (including investments in the second class of institution)
1

For just a small sample of the literature arguing that deregulation played a critical causal role in the current global
credit crisis, see James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: a Critical Assessment of the „New
Financial Architecture,‟ 33 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 563 (2009); Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk through
Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327 (2009) (arguing that
deregulation and failures of regulators to address asset-backed securities markets led to a housing bubble and
widespread fraud); Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure of Private Ordering and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 5 N.Y.U. J.
L. & BUS. 549 (2009).
2
Other scholars assert that the crisis stemmed not from deregulation but from failed or flawed regulation. E.g.
Charles W. Calomiris, Another “Deregulation” Myth, American Enterprise Institute On the Issues 2008-57 (Oct.
2009) available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20081029_5723624OTICalomiris_g.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2010)
(arguing that the Securities and Exchange Commission‟s 2004 change to its net capital rule, widely blamed for
contributing to the severity of the crisis, is an example of flawed new regulation rather than deregulation).
3
This definition is in keeping with the author‟s definition of deregulation in Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic:
Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 404 (2006).
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without regulation adequately compensating for the moral hazard of a government
guarantee;4 and
b) displacement, a term this paper coins to describe when subsidized competition5
pushes the second class into riskier market segments.
5) Additional lending increases overall leverage in the financial system and fuels a boom in
an asset market such as real estate or securities.
6) Ultimately, asset prices collapse and threaten the solvency of financial institutions,
starting with the class of institution that lacks explicit or implicit government backing.
This model aptly describes the deregulation of the Swedish finance services sector in the
1980s, which led to a severe real estate crisis in that country in 1990.6 The Swedish
government‟s response to the ensuing crisis became the subject of intense study and debate in the
United States in 2008, as U.S. policymakers searched for models for managing their own
deepening financial crisis.7 However, it is not only Sweden‟s policy response to its crisis that
sheds light on the U.S. financial meltdown; Sweden‟s history of deregulation preceding its 1990
crisis and the model outlined above also may illuminate how deregulation contributed to the
current financial crisis in the United States. The model outlined by this article – which might be
labeled “deregulation pas de deux” – provides a framework for analyzing the extent to which
several examples of deregulation of financial institutions in the United States contributed to the
severity of the current financial crisis. The model can be used for needed empirical study of the
extent to which deregulation affecting the following dual classes of financial institutions
contributed to the severity of the current credit crisis in the United States:
¶
¶
¶

The government sponsored entities (GSEs) Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae on the one
hand, and sponsors of “private label” mortgage-backed securities on the other;8
Commercial and investment banks with respect to the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act
that separated those two classes of financial institutions;9 and
Banks and hedge funds with respect to over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives.10

More particularly, the model allows scholars to focus on two questions for future
econometric research. First, to what extent did the deregulation of GSE investments, the repeal
of Glass-Steagall prohibitions on commercial banks activities, and regulatory actions that
allowed banks to invest in OTC derivatives result in either market displacement of less regulated
4

John R. Walter, Can a Safety Net Subsidy Be Contained?, 84 FED. RES. BANK RICHMOND 1, 11 (1998).
Id. John Walter describes how a subsidy could lead to growth of banks at the expense of unsubsidized
competitors, but does not describe how the competition could force those competitors into riskier segments. Id.
6
See Part II infra.
7
Carter Dougherty, Stopping a Financial Crisis, the Swedish Way, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2008, at C9; James K.
Jackson, The U.S. Financial Crisis: Lessons from Sweden, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress,
Sept. 29, 2008 available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/110770.pdf (last visited September 10,
2009).
8
The GSEs and private label securitization are described in Part IV.a infra.
9
The Glass-Steagall Act was formally known as the Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). It was repealed in
1999 by the Gramm Leach Bliley Act, formally known as the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub.L.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, enacted November 12, 1999. The Glass-Steagall Act and its repeal are analyzed in Part
IV.b. infra.
10
Regulation and the relationship between banks and hedge funds in OTC derivatives are discussed in Part IV.c.
infra.
5
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(and less-subsidized) financial institutions or subsidy leakage? Second, to what extent did any
resultant market displacement or subsidy leakage increase riskier investments by financial
institutions, fuel the increase of housing and asset-backed securities prices that ultimately
crashed, and increase the leverage and thus the vulnerability of financial institutions to a market
crash?
The pas de deux model argues for a reexamination of studies (which are discussed in Part
IV.b.) conducted just before the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act that examined whether the
repeal would result in deposit insurance subsidizing riskier bank investments that were off-limits
under that Depression era statute.11 The pas de deux model can thus frame the empirical
research needed to evaluate current financial reform proposals, particularly the so-called
“Volcker Rule,” a still vague Obama Administration proposal first announced in January 2010
that would restrict proprietary trading by bank holding companies.12 The Volcker Rule appears
to be premised in large measure on the argument that subsidy leakage contributed to the current
financial crisis; in other words, banks allegedly used funds subsidized with a Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation guarantee to make investments in asset-backed securities and hedge
funds.13
Beyond immediate policy debates, the pas de deux model reveals two more general risks.
First, the model highlights the inherent legal, political, and economic instability of creating
separate dual classes of financial institutions. A sharp legal division between classes of
institutions will be subject to political and economic pressure, as less regulated institutions earn
higher profits and capture more market share. This creates incentives for the more regulated
class both to develop legal “work-arounds” to sidestep regulatory restrictions on their lending
and investment and to push for deregulation to enable them to compete.14 Second, the model –
and particularly the risk of displacement and subsidy leakage argues that when deregulation of a
11

See infra notes 105-114 and accompanying text.
President Barack Obama, Remarks on Additional Reforms to the Financial System (Jan. 21, 2010) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-financial-reform
(last
visited
Jan.
23,
2010)[hereinafter “President Obama Remarks”]; Prohibiting Certain High-Risk Investment Activities by Banks and
Bank Holding Companies: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. __
(Feb. 2, 2010)(statement of Paul Volcker, Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board) available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=54b42cc0-7ecd-4c0d88c0-65f7d2002061&Witness_ID=091f5a89-dec4-4905-9fa1-678bfbec823a (last visited Feb. 4, 2010) [hereinafter
“Volcker Testimony”]. See also Jackie Calmes & Louis Uchitelle, Obama to Propose Limits on Risks Taken by
Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2010 at A1.
13
See President Obama Remarks, supra note 12 (“These are rules that allowed firms to act contrary to the interests
of customers, to conceal their exposure to debt through complex financial dealings, to benefit from taxpayer-insured
deposits while making speculative investments…”); Volcker Testimony, supra note 12. Former Federal Reserve
Chairman Volcker, now an advisor to the Obama Administration, explained that part of the rationale for the
proposed restrictions on bank proprietary trading was to prevent government subsidies from supporting risky
speculation:
The basic point is that there has been, and remains, a strong public interest in providing a “safety net” –in
particular, deposit insurance and the provision of liquidity in emergencies – for commercial banks carrying
out essential services. There is not, however, a similar rationale for public funds - taxpayer funds protecting and supporting essentially proprietary and speculative activities. Hedge funds, private equity
funds, and trading activities unrelated to customer needs and continuing banking relationships should stand
on their own, without the subsidies implied by public support for depository institutions.
Id.
14
Developing regulatory “work-arounds” for clients represents an essential role of transactional and regulatory
attorneys, whom Professor Ronald Gilson has famously called “transaction cost engineers.” See Ronald J. Gilson,
Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L J. 239 (1984).
12

5

Draft – February 5, 2010
subsidized class of financial institution occurs, regulators must either remove the subsidy or
actively and continuously adjust prudential regulation of that deregulated class to counteract the
potential for abuse of that subsidy. Otherwise, deregulation might allow the deregulated but still
subsidized class of institutions to compete unfairly with an unsubsidized second class and drive
that second class into riskier market segments. Alternatively, deregulation might allow the
deregulated but still subsidized class to use its government subsidy to place bets using taxpayer
funds.
This article proceeds as follows: Part II elaborates on the deregulation pas de deux model.
Part III outlines how the deregulation of financial institutions in Sweden in the 1980s fits this
model. Part IV examines whether this model can explain the interaction and deregulation of
several classes of regulated entities in the United States in the 1990s and 2000s. Part V
concludes and sketches policy implications of the pas de deux model, including for the Volcker
Rule.
II.

THE MODEL

This Part elaborates on the nuances and some variations in the six elements of the pas de
deux model of deregulation outlined in the introduction:
1)
Two categories of financial institutions: The model assumes a regulatory regime
that has two categories of financial institutions. The first category of institution is more tightly
regulated and faces restrictions on its business activities, including on the types of loans or other
investments it can make. These restrictions might take various forms, including:
¶

¶

¶
¶

regulations that limit financial institutions to particular lines of business to shield
them from excessive losses and to allow regulators to assess better the risks that the
institutions face;15
restrictions on the types of investments that financial institutions may make,
including, for example, restrictions on investments in real estate16 and riskier classes
of securities, such as equity;17
prudential restrictions on the number of loans to certain types of borrowers;18 and
caps on interest rates that banks may charge their borrowers19 or offer to their
depositors.20

15

For example, U.S. federal banking law circumscribes the non-banking commercial business in which banks may
engage or own. See e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2008) (enumerating powers of national banks).
16
E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 29 (2008) (restricting ability of national banks to invest in real estate).
17
E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2008) (specifying categories of securities investments which national banks are permitted to
make).
18
For example, U.S. federal banking laws limit the loans that banks may have outstanding to one borrower. 12
U.S.C. §§ 84, 1464(u) (2008); 12 C.F.R. § 32.1(b) (2008). Another set of laws restrict a bank‟s loans to other
depositary institutions to prevent the collapse of one institution from threatening others. 12 U.S.C. § 371b-2 (2008);
12 C.F.R. § 206 (2008).
19
For a description of how federal law in the United States has cut back on state usury laws, see Michael S. Barr,
Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. REG. 121, 148 (2004); Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending:
Unmasking the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 35-37 (2005); Elizabeth R. Schlitz, The Amazing, Elastic,
Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518
(2004).
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In return for being subject to these regulatory restrictions, this first class of institution
enjoys certain regulatory subsidies. This subsidy may take the form of a government guarantee
that may be explicit (for example, deposit insurance21) or implicit (for example, a widely held
perception in the marketplace that a government would back the debts of this type of institution
should it become insolvent). One variant on this implicit guarantee is the “too-big-to-fail” (or
“too-interconnected-to-fail”) financial institution; scholars have argued that many investors
believe that the government would have to assume the obligations of large, “systemically
significant” financial institutions – even absent an explicit guarantee – because the insolvency of
those institutions might trigger severe cascading losses in financial markets. 22 Regulatory
subsidies may take still other forms such as tax breaks or exemptions from other fields of
regulation, such as securities regulation. Institutions in the second regulatory category do not
enjoy these subsidies (or at least not to the same extent as the first category), but are also not
subject to the same restrictions on lending, investment, or business operations.
The tradeoff in this dual regulatory scheme has a certain economic logic. If the
government grants a regulatory subsidy – particularly a guarantee – to a class of institution it
wants to limit risk-taking to mitigate moral hazard.23 This division may also offer creditors of
(including depositors) and investors in financial institutions a choice between lower risk (the first
class) and higher reward (the second class). The restrictions on the first class of institution not
only limit excessive risk-taking, but prevent that class of institution from using its regulatory
subsidy to gain a competitive advantage over the second class (a topic discussed in more detail in
Part II, Section 5 below).
2)
Pressure to deregulate of the first class of institution: The second class of
institution earn higher profits on the activities that are foreclosed to the first category. This
success may occur because higher risk produces higher reward or, more particularly, because a
specific loan or investment market begins to heat up. The less regulated second class may win
market share as investors or borrowers flock to the market segment closed to the more regulated
class of financial institution. These profits of the second class create pressure to relax the
restrictions on the first category to allow those institutions to participate in that restricted, but
20

For example, the Federal Reserve Board‟s now defunct Regulation Q imposed caps on the interest rates
depository institutions could offer to depositors. 12 CFR Pt. 217 (1979). The Depositary Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980 required the phased elimination of Regulation Q. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat.
132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) See R. Alton Gilbert, Requiem for Regulation Q: What
It Did and Why It Passed Away, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 22 (Feb. 1986).
21
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO L.J. 193, 210 (2008) (describing deposit insurance as a tool to
mitigate systemic risk).
22
For an earlier article analyzing “too-big-to-fail” financial institutions, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to
Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957 (1992). See also Walter,
supra note 4, at 7-8. A more recent variant of the “too-big-to-fail” concern is the “too-interconnected-to fail”
financial institution. Under this theory, a government may not allow some financial institutions to fail for fear of the
repercussions to their financial institution counterparties. See Onnig H. Dombalagian Requiem for the Bulge
Bracket?: Revisiting Investment Bank Regulation, 85 IND. L. J. __ (forthcoming 2010).
23
Moral hazard refers to the perverse incentives for insured parties to take on excessive risk. For an analysis of how
deposit insurance may contribute to moral hazard, see Patricia A. McCoy, The Moral Hazard Implications of
Deposit Insurance: Theory and Evidence, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
MONETARY
AND
FINANCIAL
LAW,
VOLUME
5
__
(2008)
available
at
http://www.imf.org/External/NP/seminars/eng/2006/mfl/pam.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2010).
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lucrative market. This push for deregulation can come from various sources. These sources
might include:
¶
¶
¶
¶

the institutions in the first category or their investors (both of which groups are
motivated by the prospect of increased profits);
politicians interested in the subsidized entities becoming more competitive or less
dependent on the government subsidy;
regulators looking to minimize regulatory arbitrage caused by dual classes of entities;
and
groups pursuing other social objectives, such as increasing the availability of credit to
consumers and businesses.

Arguments for deregulation may include rhetoric in favor of “leveling the playing field” for the
more heavily regulated institution.
3)
Deregulation takes shape but the subsidy remains: The political pressure to
deregulate culminates in loosening the restrictions on the first class of institution in one or two
ways:
Direct competition: deregulation may allow the first class of institution to compete
directly with the second class of institution in previously restricted (or even off-limits)
lending or investment markets.
Symbiotic lending or investment: alternatively, deregulation may allow the first class to
extend credit to or invest in the second class. This allows the first class to increase its
indirect participation in those lucrative, riskier lending or investment markets.
These two forms of deregulation are not mutually exclusive; policymakers may implement both
simultaneously or sequentially. Regardless of the form of deregulation, after it occurs, the first
class still retains much of its government subsidy.
4)
Two consequences of deregulation: Regulators often fail to ensure that other
appropriate prudential regulatory safeguards are in place, including adequate supervision of the
newly deregulated class and enforcement of existing regulations. Deregulation combined with a
government subsidy may result in one of the following two possible perverse outcomes:
a)
Subsidy leakage: Without adequate safeguards, the deregulated financial
institutions may take on excessive risk due to subsidized government funds or the moral
hazard of a government guarantee. This risk-taking comes in the forms of new loans or
investments that were previously off-limits. The government subsidy of a deregulated
firm‟s core activities – such as bank lending from depositor funds – begins to leak to the
new investment activities of the institution.24 This leakage may be intrafirm – if the
24

Walter, supra note 4, at 11. Arthur Wilmarth argued in 2002 that banks that were “too-big-to-fail” could transfer
this implicit subsidy to (“cross-subsidize”) non-bank affiliates. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the
U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risk, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV.
215, 446-449.
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institution uses funds from a subsidized affiliate to fund investment operations of a less
regulated affiliate25 – or interfirm – if the institution uses subsidized funds to invest in an
unaffiliated entity (such as a financial institution in the second, less regulated class). The
new investment activities thus shifts greater risk to a government guarantee originally
intended to provide more limited protection (for example, protecting bank depositors)
against more traditional risks (for example, bank runs) with taxpayers bearing greater
risk.26
b)
Displacement: if deregulation allows the first class to compete with the second
class, the unsubsidized second class may face a competitive disadvantage.27 The
government subsidy may afford the first class a lower cost of capital.28 For example,
deposit insurance or an implicit government guarantee allows the first class of institution
to raise capital more cheaply. If deregulation allows the first class to form a new
business unit to compete with the second class in a new market, this lower cost of capital
may enable institutions in the first class to cross-subsidize that business unit. This
competitive advantage enjoyed by the first class of institution enables those institutions to
gain market share and pushes the unsubsidized second class of entities into riskier market
segments. For example, the second class of institution newly forced to compete in a loan
market with the first class may lower underwriting standards and extend loans to less
creditworthy borrowers.
5)
Increased Lending and Leverage Fuels Market Boom: Either displacement or
symbiotic lending increases the overall level of lending in the economy. Higher asset prices may
in turn generate various feedback loops. For example, higher prices may encourage further risky
lending, mask inadequate underwriting standards, and lull regulators, creditors, and investors
into a false sense of security.29 Alternatively, Professor John Geanakoplos has recently outlined
how a feedback loop may develop through what he labels the leverage cycle. This cycle may be
summarized as follows: when firms investing in an asset market increase their leverage, more
money flows into asset markets causing prices to rise. Rising prices increase the value of the
collateral that leveraged firms have posted. Higher-valued collateral frees up the firms to invest
additional capital, causing asset prices and the value of collateral to rise even further. A
feedback loop develops.30

25

Intrafirm subsidies may take the form of intracompany loans, or asset purchases, dividends, or equity investments
in direct subsidiaries. Id. at 11-13.
26
See id. at 11.
27
Id. at 11.
28
Id. at 10.
29
This is what some scholars argue happened in Sweden after deregulation of banks in the 1980s. See infra notes
69-72 and accompanying text. Higher asset prices may also reinforce lending when some borrowers can only repay
some types of loans – most recently subprime borrowers and adjustable-rate-mortgages (“ARMs”) – by refinancing,
which, in turn, can only occur if asset prices appreciate. Stephen G. Ryan, Accounting in and for the Subprime
Crisis, 83 ACCOUNTING REV. 1605, __ (2008)(analyzing the “binary” nature of ARMs as only functioning when
housing prices rise).
30
However, when asset prices drop, the value of collateral also drops and leveraged firms can be required by their
creditors either to post more collateral or to reduce their leveraged positions. Firms must sell assets to meet margin
calls, which causes asset prices to plummet further. This creates a vicious deleveraging feedback loop. See e.g.,
Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos, Leverage Cycles and the Anxious Economy, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1211 (2008); John
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6)
Asset Prices Collapse and Financial Crisis: Ultimately, asset prices collapse and
threaten the solvency of financial institutions starting with the second class of institution that was
forced into riskier market segments. If asset prices fall far enough and enough borrowers
default, the first class of institution may also be threatened, triggering government guarantees.
III.

DEREGULATION IN SWEDEN IN THE 1980S

The preceding model provides a good template for understanding the deregulation of
financial institutions in Sweden in the 1980s that led to the severe 1990 real estate crisis in that
country.31 The Swedish real estate bubble was exacerbated by interaction of two regulatory
classes of financial institutions: banks and finance companies. The regulatory differences
between these two types of institutions created feedback loops between the financial and political
marketplaces as deregulation, riskier lending practices, and booming asset prices reinforced one
another.
1. Two Categories of Financial Institutions: In the 1970s, Sweden had a highly regulated
banking sector that was subject to a series of legal restrictions designed to maintain stable and
low interest rates and to direct credit toward favored economic sectors such as housing and
public finance.32 These regulations included various measures that restricted the volume of a
bank‟s lending, including high reserve requirements, placement requirements, and liquidity
ratios.33 Together, placement requirements and liquidity ratios required that a certain percentage
of bank‟s lending portfolio include government and housing bonds.34 The Swedish central bank
also controlled the volume of bank credit by using regulation, moral suasion, and access to
central bank loans to impose quantitative restrictions on lending by each bank.35 Swedish banks
were also subject to ceilings on the average interest rates they charge on their loans.36 Although
Sweden removed legal caps on the interest rates that banks could offer depositors in the 1970s, a
few large banks continued to dominate the industry, and the absence of competition37 kept
Geanakoplos, The Leverage Cycle, Cowles Found. Discussion Paper No. 1715 (July 31, 2009) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1441943.
31

The Norwegian and Finnish banking sectors experienced similar deregulation in the 1980s and a crisis at roughly
the same time as Sweden. For economic literature comparing deregulation in Sweden with that of other
Scandinavian countries in the same period, see Lars Jonung, Lessons from Financial Liberalisation in Scandinavia,
50 COMP. ECON. STUD. 564 (2008); Burkhard Drees & Ceyla Pazarbaşioğlu, The Nordic Banking Crises: Pitfalls in
Financial Liberalization, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 161 __ (Apr. 1998); Peter
Englund & Vesa Vihriälä, Financial Crises in Developed Economies: the Cases of Sweden and Finland (Pellervo
Econ.
Res.
Inst.
Working
Paper
No.
63,
Mar.
2003)
available
at
http://www.ptt.fi/dokumentit/tp63_1809080802.pdf. (last visited Sept. 10, 2009).
32
Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 3. See also Bengt Larsson, Neo-liberalism and Polycontextuality:
Banking Crisis and Re-regulation in Sweden, 32 ECON. & SOC‟Y 428 (2003).
33
Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 4.
34
Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 5; Peter Englund, The Swedish Banking Crisis: Roots and
Consequences, 15 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL‟Y 80, 83 (1999).
35
Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 5. Englund, supra note 34, at 83. The Swedish Central Bank applied
moral suasion through weekly meetings among the head of that institution and senior executives of private sector
banks. Id.
36
Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 3.
37
This absence of competition resulted from legal prohibitions on entry. From 1945 to 1983, Sweden granted no
new banking licenses. E. PHILLIP DAVIS, DEBT FINANCIAL FRAGILITY AND SYSTEMIC RISK 256 (1995).
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deposit rates low.38 Together, Swedish bank regulations ensured that Swedish banks enjoyed
steady, but low profits39 and minimal risk.40 Although Sweden had no explicit deposit insurance
scheme before or immediately after deregulation, scholars posit that there was public perception
of implicit deposit insurance – i.e., that the government would not allow banks to fail in a
financial crisis.41
Finance companies did not face these same restrictions and thus were able to gain a
competitive advantage over banks.42 Finance companies were founded decades earlier in
Sweden.43 These lenders started in lending to consumer and small business loans,44 but by the
1980s had moved into numerous other lending markets, including factoring and leasing.45 At the
same time, finance companies faced limitations on funding sources not applicable to banks. In
the late 1980s, Swedish regulations prohibited finance companies from accepting deposits from
the public or issuing certificates of deposit or bonds.46 Finance companies relied heavily either
on short-maturity loans from banks and other lenders or on issuing investment certificates, also
with short maturities.47 Banks thus provided a significant source of financing for finance
companies, which increased bank exposure when finance companies later faltered in Sweden‟s
financial crisis.48
These less regulated finance companies began to gain market share over banks in loans to
both businesses and households.49 Some scholars attribute this to ballooning public sector debt.
They argue that as public debt increased, the requirements that banks hold government bonds in
their portfolio required them to compensate by curbing loans to the private sector.50 The number
of finance companies expanded from 67 in 1970 to 292 in 1988.51 Scholars have categorized the
rise of finance companies in Sweden as part of the growth of a “grey credit market.”52 Swedish
banks responded to competition from the grey market by establishing their own finance company
subsidiaries.53
38

Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 3.
Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 7.
40
Jonung, supra note 31, at 567 (“Banking was rendered an almost risk-free enterprise in this system”). Sweden
also restricted access by foreign banks to the Swedish market. See Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 6.
41
Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 15.
42
L. Peter Jennergren, The Swedish Finance Company Crisis – Could It Have Been Anticipated?, 50
SCANDINAVIAN ECON. HIST. REV. 7, __ (2002); see also Davis, supra note 37, at 256; Dwight M. Jaffee, The
Swedish
Real
Estate
Crisis
82
(Oct.
1994)(unpublished
manuscript,
available
at
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/jaffee/Papers/Sweden.pdf. (last visited Sept. 10, 2009).
43
There is some disagreement over when finance companies first began. Compare Davis, supra note 37, at 256
(asserting finance companies were an innovation of the 1920s and 1930s) with Jennergren, supra note 42, at [4]
(“Finance companies started in the 1960s.”).
44
Davis, supra note 37, at 256.
45
Davis, supra note 37, at 256; Englund, supra note 34, at 85; see generally Jennergren, supra note 42, at [4]
(describing forms of credit provided by finance companies).
46
Jennergren, supra note 42, at [5].
47
Jennergren, supra note 42, at [5-6]; Englund, supra note 34, at 85.
48
Englund, supra note 34, at 85.
49
Jennergren, supra note 42, at [5]; Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 9. See also Englund, supra note 34,
at 85.
50
Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 9.
51
Davis, supra note 37, at 256. In 1988, finance companies collectively held assets of 171 billion Swedish kroner.
Id.
52
Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 9.
53
Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 9-10.
39
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2. Push for Deregulation: The Swedish government grew concerned that its bank
regulatory regime was increasingly being circumvented by the growth of finance companies and
other sources of credit.54 Scholars have also cited a desire to increase bank profits as a goal of
regulators in deregulation.55 Other scholars have characterized deregulation of the financial
sector as part of a larger “neoliberal” political movement that aimed to shrink the public sector
and welfare state.56
3. Deregulation: Regardless of the reason, from 1983 to 1985, among other
liberalization reforms, Sweden repealed liquidity ratios, removed ceilings on bank loan rates,
lifted volume restrictions on loans, and abolished placement ratios.57
4. Deregulation Enables Increased Lending: In the wake of deregulation, pent up
consumer and business demand for credit exploded.58 Deregulated banks dramatically expanded
lending in part to meet surging demand and recapture market share in an increasingly
competitive market.59 Competitive pressures and the pursuit of increased profits drove
dramatically increased bank lending, particularly to the real estate sector, but also to other riskier
and more cyclical economic sectors.60 One scholar argues that deregulation resulted in a shift in
bank portfolios that dramatically increased bank exposures to credit risk.61
It appears that deregulation of banks did result in displacement by pushing finance
companies to riskier market segments. For example, the ensuing competition in real estate loans
pushed finance companies to enter more marginal lending markets and take on higher credit
risk.62 Finance companies began extending loans to applicants previously rejected by banks,
extending real estate loans with only junior security interests, investing in highly leveraged
commercial real estate projects, and financing investments in equity securities.63 Analyzing
whether subsidy leakage occurred is more complex. The government guarantee of bank
obligations was at best implicit.64 Nevertheless, banks continued to enjoy lower funding costs
via regulatory restrictions on the funding sources of finance companies.65 (This regulatory
advantage of banks may also have played a role in the displacement of finance companies.)66
Moreover, scholars have noted that banks provided significant levels of credit to finance
companies.67
54

Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 9-10; Englund, supra note 34, at 84.
Dwight M. Jaffee, The Swedish Real Estate Crisis 89-90 (Oct. 1994)(unpublished manuscript, available at
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/jaffee/Papers/Sweden.pdf. (last visited Sept. 10, 2009).
56
See Timothy A. Canova, The Swedish Model Betrayed, 37 CHALLENGE 36 (May-June 1994) (describing politics
of deregulation); Brian Burkitt & Phil Whyman, The Origins of the Recent Swedish Crisis: a Lesson for the
European Left, 93:4 EUR. BUS. REV. 33 (1993); Larsson, supra note 32.
57
Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 10; Davis, supra note 37, at 256; Peter Englund, Financial
Deregulation in Sweden, 34 EUR. ECON. REV. 385, 385-86 (1990); Englund, supra note 34, at 83.
58
Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 12-14.
59
Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 15; Jaffee, supra note 55, at 84. See also Englund, supra note 34, at 84.
60
Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 15; Jaffee, supra note 55, at 86-89 (noting, however, that Swedish bank
statistics do not track real estate loans as a separate category).
61
Jaffee, supra note 55, at 84-87.
62
Jennergren, supra note 42, at [5]; Englund, supra note 34, at 85.
63
Jennergren, supra note 42, at [5]; Davis, supra note 37, at 256.
64
See supra note 41, and accompanying text.
65
See supra notes 46-47, and accompanying text.
66
See Jennergren, supra note 42, at [5-9]; Englund, supra note 34, at 89-90.
67
See supra note 41, and accompanying text.
55
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5. Asset market boom: Increased lending and lower underwriting standards fueled a
dramatic lending boom; the ratio of bank loans to total GDP skyrocketed just as financial sector
deregulation ended in 1986.68 One scholar argues that increases in bank real estate lending
resulted in a feedback loop, as increased lending stimulated further increases in real estate prices
and demand for real estate.69 This boom reinforced risky loan underwriting practices.70 Lenders
dramatically increased their loan-to-value ratios for mortgages for owner-occupied residences.71
The boom also lowered the guard of regulators; scholars have faulted Swedish bank regulators
for failing to strengthen and adapt prudential safety-and-soundness bank regulation to a more
competitive, deregulated lending environment.72
Some economists contend that bank deregulation precipitated the boom in lending and
asset prices.73 Others find that, although this deregulation was not the catalyst for the initial
lending boom and economic expansion, it did magnify those trends.74 Deregulation stimulated a

68

Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 13. For other data on the extent of the lending boom, see Englund,
supra note 34, at 84-86.
69
Jaffee, supra note 55, at 88.
70
Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 15. In terms of lowered loan underwriting standards, the following
account of Drees and Pazarbaşioğlu has eerie parallels to accounts of the U.S. subprime crisis:
The shift to more price competition weakened traditionally close banking relationships and impaired banks‟
ability to assess credit risks and monitor borrowers.
Id.
71
Englund, supra note 34, at 85.
72
Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 21; Jonung, supra note 31, at 581-82, 587-88; Urban Bäckström, What
Lessons Can Be Learned from Recent Financial Crises? The Swedish Experience, FED. RES. BANK. K.C.
PROCEEDINGS 129, 138 (1997) available at http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/1997/pdf/s97backs.pdf (last
visited Jan. 4, 2010); Martin Andersson & Staffan Viotti, Managing and Preventing Financial Crises – Lessons
from the Swedish Experience, 1999:1 SVERIGES RIKSBANK Q. REV. 71, 77 (1999). Some commentators fault
regulators for failing to recognize the dangers of high concentrations of real estate loans and the foreign exchange
risk created by a large number of loans being denominated in foreign currencies but in which the assets were
denominated in the local currency. Stefan Ingves & Goran Lind, Stockholm Solutions, INT‟L MONETARY FUND
FINANCE
&
DEVELOPMENT
21-22
(Dec.
2008)
available
at
https://www.imf.org/external/Pubs/FT/fandd/2008/12/pdf/ingves.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2010).
Another scholar questions whether real estate lending was directly regulated at all and faults bankers and
supervisors for failing to consider excessive concentrations of loans in specific sectors, the need for conservative
initial underwriting in new loan markets, and the importance of careful valuations of the collateral and cash flows
available to service each loan. Jaffee, supra note 55, at 90.
For a devastating critique of the lack of understanding of regulators of the need to adjust prudential
regulation in a deregulated financial sectors, see Director Stefan Ingves, Monetary and Exchange Affairs
Department, Banking, Insurance and Securities Commission of Norway, The Nordic Banking Crisis from an
International Perspective, Remarks at the International Monetary Fund (Sept. 11, 2002) available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/091102.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2010). Mr. Ingves said:
Another contributing cause to banking crisis is premature financial liberalization, together with inadequate
preparation among bankers and supervisors. The former may not have the needed skills to manage and
price risk, and the latter may not be given adequate resources and competencies to monitor the more
complex new risks. This can easily create a situation with pure ignorance about the risks involved among
relevant parties. Not having a clue about what is going on is sometimes a much more important cause of
serious difficulties than the in academia so often discussed moral hazard. Id.
73
E.g., Davis, supra note 37, at 256. See also Jonung et al., supra note 31, at 49, 54. Cf. Bäckström, supra note 72,
at 130 (“Credit market deregulation in 1985 . . . meant that monetary conditions became more expansionary.”)
74
Englund, supra note 34, at 88-89, 95-96. Cf. Jonung, supra note 31, at 577 (describing general trend of financial
deregulation in Scandinavian countries triggering asset price booms).
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competition among financial institutions, in which lenders focused on expansion rather than
prudent lending practices.75
6. Crisis: The lending boom and rise in asset prices ended in dramatic fashion in 1989,
as depreciation of the Swedish currency triggered massive defaults on the growing number of
domestic loans denominated in foreign currencies.76 A rise in nonperforming loans and
declining collateral values triggered a banking crisis, with finance companies facing financial
difficulties first.77 Some scholars claim that financial losses first spilled over to banks via their
investments in finance companies.78 In the early stages of the Swedish financial crisis, losses on
real estate loans dominated, but losses eventually spread to other loans.79 Losses in real estate
loans were mirrored by steep declines in real estate prices, which in turn paralleled declines in
bank share prices.80 The worsening crisis led to the Swedish government taking extraordinary
measures to guarantee bank loans and bail out financial institutions, including nationalizing two
large banks.81
IV.

DEREGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE CURRENT CRISIS

Sweden‟s experience with financial institution deregulation fits the pas de deux model
fairly well. This fit leads to the question of whether the same model may explain the
contribution of various episodes of deregulation to the current U.S. financial crisis. This Part IV
sketches out how the model might fit the interactions, respectively, of: (a) government sponsored
entities and sponsors of “private label” securitizations; (b) commercial banks and investment
banks with respect to the repeal of the Glass-Steagall division between those two categories of
financial institutions; and (c) banks and hedge funds and OTC derivatives. This sketch is meant
to provide a framework for further econometric analysis of the extent to which displacement or
subsidy leakage occurred after these three episodes of deregulation and the extent to which
displacement or subsidy leakage contributed to the boom in the housing and asset-backed
securities markets and the vulnerability of financial institutions to a crash in those markets.
a.

Government Sponsored Entities and Private Label Securitizations.

Other economists have found no causal link between Swedish deregulation of financial institutions and a
boom in consumption. Jonas Agell & Lennart Berg, Does Financial Deregulation Cause a Consumption Boom?, 98
SCAND. J. ECON. 579 (1996). Agell and Berg do note that their study does not consider whether deregulation might
have affected “investment patterns, asset choice and borrowing for commercial purposes.” Id. at 597. See also
Massimiliano Rimarchi, Financial Liberalization, Credit Boom and Recession: a Business Cycle Accounting
Perspective
for
Sweden
(Dec.
8,
2008)
(unpublished
manuscript,
available
at
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/events/mafc/Rimarchi.pdf. (last visited Sept. 10, 2009)) (paper for Univ. of Cambridge
Fac. of Econ. Conf. on “Macroeconomic and Financial Linkages: Theory and Practice”). Rimarchi concludes that
bank deregulation did not loosen bank credit, did not spur growth in asset markets, and did not contribute to the
vulnerability of the Swedish economy to financial crisis. Id. at 23.
75
Englund, supra note 34, at 95-96; Andersson & Viotti, supra note 72, at 72.
76
Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 22-23. See generally Englund, supra note 34, at 89-92.
77
Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 23; Englund, supra note 34, at 89-90.
78
Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 23; Englund, supra note 34, at 90.
79
Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 23.
80
See Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 23.
81
Drees & Pazarbaşioğlu, supra note 31, at 29-30.
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1. Two Categories of Financial Institutions: Congress chartered Freddie Mac and Fannie
Mae as privately owned companies to create a liquid national market for residential mortgages to
promote increased homeownership.82 Before the financial crisis, scholars debated whether or not
these two GSEs enjoyed an implicit guarantee from the federal government of their obligations
in the event of their insolvency.83 The financial crisis culminating with the government taking
over the GSEs in conservatorship settled the argument; the guarantee is no longer implicit. 84
Beyond an implicit guarantee, Freddie and Fannie enjoyed a raft of other regulatory subsidies,
including tax exemptions, exemptions from various securities laws, and laws granting special
status to GSE securities making them equivalent to government securities (enabling federal
agencies, fiduciaries, and federally regulated lenders to invest in GSE securities). 85 Moreover,
Freddie and Fannie were subject to weaker capital requirements than other federally regulated
financial institutions, which enabled them to take on more leverage and hence more risk.86
To fulfill their missions, Freddie and Fannie engaged in two lines of business. First, they
pioneered the creation of mortgage-backed securities. The two GSEs would purchase pools of
residential mortgages that met certain credit standards and other criteria. The future cash streams
from these mortgages would be used to issue securities to investors that Freddie and Fannie
would guarantee. Second, the GSEs purchased for their own investment portfolios mortgages
and mortgaged-backed securities issued by others.87 The success of the GSEs in the first line of
business spawned competition, as other financial institutions entered the mortgage-backed
securities market in several waves from the 1970s to the early 2000s. These financial institutions
sponsored new issuances of residential mortgage-backed securities – in what are called “private
label” securitizations. The sponsors of those issuances, however, did not benefit from the
implicit guarantee and other regulatory subsidies enjoyed by Freddie and Fannie.88
2. & 3. Push for Deregulation & Deregulation: In the case of Freddie and Fannie,
deregulation took the form of government pressure for the two companies to loosen their
standards for their respective retained investment portfolios to allow them to purchase higher risk
mortgages in which low-income individuals were the borrowers.89 Freddie and Fannie
purchased these riskier mortgages in response to competition from Wall Street banks that were
using similar mortgages to back private label securitizations.90 Press accounts describe the
82

David Reiss, The Federal Government‟s Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac‟s Obligations:
Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019, 102-23 (2008).
83
Compare Reiss, supra note 82 (arguing an implicit guarantee existed) with Richard Scott Carnell, Handling the
Failure of a Government-Sponsored Enterprise, 80 WASH. L. REV. 565, __ (2005). Professor Carnell documented
government disavowals of a guarantee and argued that the guarantee was more a matter of investor perception. Id.
at __.
84
For an analysis of the regulatory privileges enjoyed by the GSEs after Freddie and Fannie were placed into
conservatorship and taken over by the Federal government, see David J. Reiss, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and
the Future of Federal Housing Finance Policy: A Study of Regulatory Privilege, 61 ALA. L. REV. __ (forthcoming
2009).
85
Reiss, supra note 82, at 1055-65.
86
Id. at 1065.
87
Id. at 1027-1033.
88
Id. at 1030 (describing private label securitizations), 1052-68 (describing unique regulatory privileges enjoyed by
GSEs).
89
Binyamin Appelbaum, How Washington Failed to Rein in Fannie, Freddie, WASH.POST., Sept. 14, 2008, at __.
90
See id. Christopher L. Peterson, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Home Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis, 10
LOYOLA J. PUB. INTEREST L. 149, 163 (2009). Professor Chris Peterson describes the competition from private
label securitizations giving rise to abusive mortgage lending practices:
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pressure that the chief executive of Fannie Mae was under in 2004 to allow his company to
purchase riskier mortgages from mortgage lenders:
…[H]is company was under siege. Competitors were snatching away lucrative parts of
its business. Congress was demanding that Mr. Mudd help steer more loans to lowincome borrowers. Lenders were threatening to sell directly to Wall Street unless Fannie
bought a bigger chunk of their riskiest loans.91
One scholar dates the decision of the GSEs to lower their purchasing standards to the 1990s, and
attributes the decision to political pressure from Congress, the Executive Branch, and the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development.92 Other accounts fault the George W. Bush
Administration; animated by a belief in free markets and the importance of encouraging home
ownership, that Administration pursued a broad set of regulatory initiatives to stimulate
mortgage lending.93 These policies included the President pushing Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae
to increase support of lending to low-income borrowers.94 On the same day that the head of the
federal agency that regulated Freddie and Fannie issued a report outlining the risk that those
firms could default on their obligations and spark a market crisis, the White House attempted to
fire him.95 Only later did the Administration join with certain members of Congress in a failed
legislative attempt to impose stricter regulations on Freddie and Fannie.96
At the same time that Congress and the White House were pressuring Freddie and
Fannie, those firms were also using extensive lobbying efforts to thwart attempts to regulate
them.97 This tangled web of political lobbying by the GSEs and pressure from the Executive and
Legislative Branches makes it difficult to determine the extent to which decisions to lower GSE
investment decisions were pushed by Freddie and Fannie or, alternatively, were pushed on these
firms by their overseers.98

By the 1990s, the private label securitization market specializing in subprime mortgages, jumbo mortgages,
and an expanding array of alternative mortgage products with non-amortizing features were rapidly
capturing market share from more traditional GSEs. With the new access to large pools of capital,
unscrupulous and thinly capitalized mortgage brokers and lenders began to aggressively market a new crop
of questionable subprime and manufactured home mortgage loans. Legal aid attorneys, consumer
advocates, and the press began to see an increase in the volume of what America would come to call
predatory mortgages.
Id. at 160.
91
Charles Duhigg, Pressured to Take More Risk, Fannie Reached a Tipping Point, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008 at A1.
92
Richard E. Mendales, The Fall and Rise of Fannie and Freddie: Securitization After the Meltdown, 42 U.C.C.
L.J. 33, __ (2009) citing Carol D. Leonnig, How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed the Crisis, WASH. POST., June 10,
2008, at A1; Steven A. Holmes, Fannie Mae Eases Credit to Aid Mortgage Lending, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1999 at
C2; Stephen Labaton, New Agency Proposed to Oversee Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2003
at C1; and Charles W. Calomiris & Peter J. Wallison, Blame Fannie Mae and Congress for the Credit Mess, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 23, 2008 at A29.
93
Jo Becker et al., White House Philosophy Stoked Mortgage Bonfire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008 at A1.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Duhigg, supra note 91, at __; Appelbaum, supra note 89, at __.
98
Some accounts of the decision at Fannie to expand purchases of subprime mortgages focus on management
making the decision because of competitive pressures rather than responding to political pressure. E.g., Damon
Silvers & Heather Slavkin, The Legacy of Deregulation and the Financial Crisis: Linkages between Deregulation in
Labor Markets, Housing Finance Markets, and the Broader Financial Markets, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 301, 326-27
(2009).
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4. & 5. Deregulation Enables Increased Lending & Asset Market Boom: Whether
because of competitive or political pressure, Freddie and Fannie dramatically increased their
direct purchases of riskier “subprime” and “alt-A” mortgages. They also increased their
investments in private label asset-backed securities, including securities backed by those same
two riskier mortgage classes.99 These twin moves open up the possibility that the deregulation of
Freddie and Fannie described above resulted in both displacement and subsidy leakage.
Displacement would occur if GSEs, competing to purchase risky mortgages, pushed private label
securitizations into purchasing even riskier mortgages. Subsidy leakage would occur as GSE
purchases of private label asset-backed securities fueled further growth of private label
securitizations. A very cursory examination of data on both subprime mortgages and assets does
reveal a marked increase in the number of subprime mortgages being underwritten by mortgage
lenders in 2004. The following chart100 reveals a 2004 spike in both the volume of subprime
mortgages and their percentage share of all mortgage originations in the United States.

However, detailed econometric studies are needed to determine if there was causal link between
new GSE purchases of subprime mortgages and private label mortgage-backed-securities starting
in 2004 and this surge in subprime originations.
6. Crisis: Freddie and Fannie‟s investments in subprime mortgages and asset-backed
securities based on those mortgages proved catastrophic. When the subprime crisis accelerated,
defaults on subprime mortgages and resultant losses on private label asset-backed securities

99

Peterson, supra note 90, at 163.
George Selgin, Guilty as Charged, The Independent Institute (Nov. 7, 2008) available at
http://www.independent.org/publications/article.asp?id=2368 (last visited Feb. 1, 2010) citing [Inside Mortgage
Finance].
100

17

Draft – February 5, 2010
increased and damaged the financial health of the GSEs. Freddie and Fannie‟s thin capitalization
meant losses on their retained portfolios were devastating.101
b.

Commercial and Investment Banks and the Glass-Steagall Repeal.

1. Two Categories of Financial Institutions: The pas de deux model can also be applied
to analyze the contribution of the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act to the severity of the current
crisis. The Glass-Steagall Act was a Depression era federal law that circumscribed the
permissible business and investment activities of commercial banks. Glass-Steagall has been
broadly characterized as creating a wall between commercial banks and investments banks.102
After this division, many commercial banks could receive government deposit insurance, the
ability to borrow funds through the Federal Reserve‟s discount window, access to the Federal
Reserve‟s clearing services, and other regulatory privileges that could theoretically grant banks a
subsidy.103 In turn, banks faced numerous restrictions on their investment activities designed to
curtail their risk taking and the moral hazard that accompanied government insurance.
Investment banks, by contrast, could not obtain deposit insurance, but could engage in lucrative
activities including making equity investments and engaging in proprietary trading.
2. & 3. Push for Deregulation & Deregulation: By the 1980s, many banks became
attracted to the profits that investment banks earned in through these investment businesses.
These profits (and the prospects of creating financial conglomerates that could offer retail and
business customers an array of financial products through “one-stop shopping”) led banks and
other financial institutions to call for dismantling the Glass-Steagall divide.104 The entire story
of the repeal of Glass-Steagall by the Gramm Leach Bliley Act is beyond the scope of this
article. However, as repeal was being debated, economists did consider the dangers of repealing
Glass-Steagall leading to displacement or subsidy leakage (even if those terms were not used). A
series of studies conducted while the repeal was being debated analyzed whether depositary
banks would gain an unfair advantage when competing with other financial institutions by virtue
of a subsidy implicit in bank deposit insurance and banks‟ unique access to the Federal Reserve‟s
101

See Peterson, supra note 90, at 164-67.
For a concise, incisive account of the history and rationale of the Glass-Steagall Act, see Joseph Jude Norton, Up
Against “The Wall”: Glass-Steagall and the Dilemma of a Deregulated (“Reregulated”) Banking Environment, 42
BUS. LAW. 327 (1987).
103
Walter, supra note 4, at 2-7.
104
Jonathan Macey argued that the principal rationale for the Gramm Leach Bliley Act was that technological
developments had made commercial banking obsolete and that commercial banks should be thus allowed to enter
more profitable investment banking businesses. Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of Banking: Before and After
Gramm-Leach Bliley, 25 J. CORP. L. 691, 691-93 (2000). Professor Macey went on to dispute this rationale, arguing
that banks could remain profitable and that the repeal of Glass-Steagall was nevertheless justified on other grounds.
He argued that combining commercial and investment banking operations would allow financial institutions to
realize synergies and achieve diversification. Id. at 693-94.
For an account of the debate over the repeal of Glass-Steagall, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side
of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L.
REV. 963, 972-75 (2009). Professor Wilmarth explains how in the years preceding the repeal of Glass-Steagall,
bank regulators had increasingly “opened loopholes in the Glass-Steagall wall in response to competitive pressures
in the financial marketplace.” Id. at 972. Ultimately, the Federal Reserve Board allowed Citicorp, a large bank
holding company, to merge with Travelers, a financial conglomerate that included insurance and securities
subsidiaries in violation of the express prohibitions of the Act. Id. at 972-73 This threw down the gauntlet to
Congress to either repeal Glass-Steagall or force the breakup of this megamerger of financial institutions. Id.
102
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discount window and clearing services. This unfair advantage arguably might lower a bank‟s
cost of funds below market value. Reassured by a federal safety net, a bank‟s debt holders might
permit the bank to operate with lower capital and take on more risk.105
Several studies concluded that this risk was remote; these studies estimated that the
subsidy of deposit insurance was negligible or even negative due to offsetting costs of banking
regulations, including deposit insurance premiums and capital and reserve requirements.106
Other scholars concluded that, even if banks did enjoy a net subsidy, banking regulations under
Gramm Leach Bliley Act would prevent banks from passing the subsidy to other affiliates.107
Among other things, the Act allowed banks to be part of financial holding companies, which
could engage in wide range of nonbanking businesses including insurance, securities
underwriting, and investment banking, but still prohibited the bank subsidiaries of the holding
companies from engaging in many of these activities that were prohibited by Glass-Steagall.108
In addition, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley prohibited the FDIC from providing assistance (or bailing
out) to a bank‟s non-banking affiliates and subsidiaries (but this raises the question of whether
bailing out a bank would still indirectly benefit its affiliates).109
Other banking scholars expressed reservations with these conclusions that banks do not
enjoy a net subsidy and cautioned that deregulation must be carefully conducted to mitigate the
risk of subsidies existing.110 At least one study found that banks did enjoy a subsidy and bank
holding companies organized their operations to take advantage of cheaper costs of funding
inside their bank subsidiaries.111
This scholarly debate reveals that whether banks enjoy a subsidy depends, in part, on
whether bank regulations are strict enough to counter any moral hazard associated with a
government guarantee. For example, appropriately calibrated deposit insurance premiums and
vigilant regulatory policing of bank risk-taking would negate a subsidy. Since deposit insurance
premiums, other bank regulations, and the level of regulatory enforcement can all change over
105

Frederick Furlong, Federal Subsidies in Banking: the Link to Financial Modernization, 97 FED. RES. BANK S.F.
ECON. LETTER 1 (1997).
106
Kenneth Jones & Barry Kolatch, The Federal Safety Net, Banking Subsidies, and Implications for Financial
Modernization, 12 F.D.I.C. BANKING REV. 1, __ (1999) (“most evidence suggests that the net marginal subsidy
received by these banks is insignificant or even negative.”); Gary Whalen, Bank Organizational Form and the Risks
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time (or can fail to adjust to changes in bank risk-taking), the question of whether banks enjoy a
subsidy is a dynamic one. For example, one of the ways in which regulators counteract the
moral hazard associated with deposit insurance is by charging banks a premium for this
insurance.112 Ideally, the amount of the premium should vary according to the risk of a bank‟s
operations. But, if premiums do not appropriate adjust for risk, then moral hazard is not
completely offset113 and subsidy leakage or displacement can occur. As one illustration of how
bank subsidies may change over time, one of the co-authors of a 2000 study that concluded bank
subsidies under Gramm Leach Bliley were not problematic (if they even existed), co-authored a
2003 study that concluded that subsequent regulatory changes led to banks enjoying increased
subsidies.114
4. & 5. Deregulation Enables Increased Lending & Asset Market Boom: The variability
of the bank subsidy argues for new studies to determine whether the repeal of Glass-Steagall
resulted in either:
¶ displacement of non-bank financial institutions into riskier market segments, or
¶ subsidy leakage, by which banks conferred a subsidy onto non-banking subsidiaries
and enabled those subsidiaries to take on excessive risk.
It is clear that the repeal of Glass-Steagall was followed by a wave of mergers and
acquisitions involving banks and securities firms, which added fuel to an already swelling wave
of financial industry consolidation.115 Arthur Wilmarth argues that the repeal of Glass-Steagall
contributed to the creation of large financial conglomerates that were responsible for an
unsustainable credit boom in the United States in the last two decades. 116 He links the removal
of Glass-Steagall barriers to explosive growth in securities underwriting that fueled the stock
market boom of the late 1990s.117 He writes:
…the relaxation and removal of Glass-Steagall barriers enabled large commercial banks
to become major players in the investment banking business after 1990. Intensifying
competition between commercial banks and securities firms stimulated a spectacular
growth in the issuance of corporate securities during the late 1990s . . . The onrush of
newly-issued securities contributed to a stock market boom from 1994 to 2000,
comparable to the great bull market of 1923 to 1929.118
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This bull market ultimately crashed at the turn of the century, “representing the larges percentage
drop in stock values since the stock market‟s collapse between 1929 and 1932.”119
Professor Wilmarth similarly faults large financial conglomerates for contributing to the
subprime housing boom and subsequent financial crisis through fostering the origination of risky
subprime consumer mortgages and other loans, the securitization of those loans (the private label
securitizations described above), and the development of OTC derivatives to further transfer the
risk of consumer loans.120
6. Crisis: Wilmarth then traces how these devices and the financial conglomerates that
spawned them became the catalysts for the global financial crisis.121 The questions posed by the
pas de deux model are whether displacement and subsidy leakage in the wake of the GlassSteagall repeal contributed to the increased risk taking of these financial institutions. More
particularly, did the entry of commercial banks into the investment banking business push
investment banks into riskier investments? One pattern to watch for in data is whether
investment banks not affiliated with depository banks began making riskier investments than
financial holding companies with both investment bank and depository bank affiliates soon after
those holding companies formed or after their affiliates entered a market in which investment
banks were already operating. A broader question also bears examination: did bank holding
companies use any subsidies to bank subsidiaries to fund risk-taking by other subsidiaries
notwithstanding the safeguards built into the Gramm Leach Bliley Act?
c.
Banks and Hedge Funds and OTC Derivatives.
The pas de deux model might also be used to frame research into a third, subtler area of
deregulation involving banks and OTC derivative investments. Professor Saule Omarova has
authored a fascinating study of how banks, enticed by the profits of derivatives trading, pursued
a deregulatory campaign for over a decade.122 This campaign focused on convincing the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency to change gradually its regulatory interpretations of what
constitutes the “business of banking” to allow banks to engage in derivatives trades.123
The application of the pas de deux model is somewhat rougher here. The dual classes of
financial institutions would consist of:
¶ banks on the one hand, which enjoy deposit protection and other regulatory
subsidies,124 but were previously constrained in derivatives trading by federal law that
defined the “business of banking”125 (banks remain subject to other regulatory
burdens such as capital requirements, but deregulation has also dialed down these
regulatory burdens);126 and
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other financial institutions, on the other hand, that were not so restricted and thus
could earn additional profits on derivatives trading.127
Hedge funds represent a clear example of institutions that fit under the second category. These
unregulated entities could trade in derivatives without regulatory encumbrance.128
If the pas de deux model fits this example of deregulation, it is likely that it resulted in
subsidy leakage rather than displacement. This is because freeing banks to engage in derivatives
traded created a symbiotic relationship between banks and hedge funds. Banks benefit from
having hedge funds as counter parties; lacking regulatory restrictions on risk-taking, hedge funds
could take on more risk, particularly by selling credit protection in credit derivatives.129 Banks
on the other hand enjoy a cheap cost of capital and presented a lower degree of counterparty risk
thanks to deposit insurance and government regulation.130 Through their global networks of
customer relationships, banks were able to connect hedge funds to other firms seeking to enter
into derivative transactions.131 (Aside from banking, subsidy leakage may explain how AIG
became such an important player in the credit derivative market that ultimately brought that
heavily regulated and subsidized insurance company to its knees in the financial crisis.)
Derivatives, particularly credit derivatives, likely played an important role in the boom of
the housing and asset-backed securities market. Credit derivatives allowed investors to offload
risk from investing in mortgages and asset-backed securities. With this risk spread to other
parties, investors could invest additional money in mortgages and asset-backed securities with
the proceeds ultimately flowing back as additional credit to mortgage borrowers. Additional
credit may fuel housing price increases. This connection among mortgages, mortgage-backed
and other asset-backed securities, and credit derivatives has been called the “shadow banking
system.”132
V.

CONCLUSION

As noted above empirical research is needed to determine the extent to which
displacement and subsidy leakage contributed to the current financial crisis. Findings of either
phenomenon would lend support to the still vague Volcker Rule proposed by the Obama
Administration, which appears to be intended to limit the ability of banks to use government
insured funds to engage in riskier investments.133 But the pas de deux model also suggests that a
127
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prohibition on profitable bank investments – such as the Volcker Rule – would inevitably come
under increasing political pressure over time, as banks would lose valuable profit opportunities to
less encumbered financial institutions. Banks would then either seek “workarounds” for the
Volcker Rule or push for deregulation.
Beyond this immediate policy application, the pas de deux model has two more general
policy implications. First, the model suggests that policymakers realize the inherent economic
and political instability of creating dual classes of financial institutions – one class that is
subsidized and regulated and another that is not. Second, the model argues that regulators must
take great care when deregulation would allow a subsidized class of financial institution to
compete with an unsubsidized class. Regulators must neutralize the possibility of subsidy
leakage. This may mean convincing the marketplace that the government is no longer providing
a guarantee of the deregulated class. But it may be impossible or inadvisable to remove many
government guarantees. For example, many economists, including Milton Friedman, believe
that government insurance of bank deposits may play a valuable role in staving off bank runs.134
If subsidies cannot be removed, regulators must calibrate the use of other banking regulations –
deposit insurance premiums, capital requirements, reserve requirements, and inspection and
enforcement – to counter the subsidy. Efforts, such as in the Gramm Leach Bliley Act,135 to
cabin the subsidy through divisions between affiliates of financial conglomerates will, however,
be under constant pressure; creative lawyering will work to undermine these regulatory efforts.
Again, legal separations between classes of financial institutions will be hard to sustain
politically in the face of a less regulated class earning consistently higher profits.
Even more broadly, the pas de deux model provides an example of the value of
integrating models of economics and political economy. Integrated models can illuminate the
various political and economic pressures that change regulation – whether of financial
institutions or otherwise – over time. Efforts to design an optimal framework for regulation must
contend with a dynamic political, economic, and legal environment that may require constant
adaptation by regulators.
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